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I. INTRODUCTION

Immigration issues are increasingly becoming a political
hotbed as federal immigration reforms have floundered, illegal
immigration continues to rise, and governments fight to control the
unwanted consequences of a perceived inadequate federal policy.'
Copyright 2009, by SuSAN M. BARTLE'r.
1. Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona, stated the following in enacting
Arizona Revised Statute section 23-212: "[It] is now abundantly clear that
Congress finds itself incapable of coping with the comprehensive immigration
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Former Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Dorris Meisner, summarized the current state of
immigration affairs within the nation, "I don't think there's been a
time like this in our lifetime .

. .

. Even though immigration is

always unsettling and somewhat controversial, we haven't seen
this kind of2intensity and widespread, deep-seated anger for almost
100 years.",

Cities and states have responded to the immigration influx in a
variety of ways, but most recently there has been a bevy of
legislative and enforcement activities. Legislative actions range
from English-only ordinances to occupancy ordinances, which aim
to prevent the harboring of illegal immigrants, to employer
ordinances that suspend and even revoke business licenses for
employers who persistently employ illegal workers. This list is far
from comprehensive, as states and cities have created numerous
other ordinances in efforts to control the consequences of increased
illegal immigration.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
570 pieces of immigration legislation were introduced in 2006.' Of
these, eighty-four bills were signed into law, which is more than
double the number that were enacted in 2005. In 2006, thirty-two
states enacted immigration laws. 4 More recently, the New York
Times reported that state legislatures across the nation have5
considered 1,404 pieces of legislation concerning immigration.
The increase in statutes that address illegal immigration seems to
suggest that illegal immigration is a primary concern for many
state and local governments.

reforms our country needs. Because of Congress' failure to act, states like
Arizona have no choice but to take strong action to discourage the further flow
of illegal immigration through our borders." Kate Riley, Opinion, Piecemeal
Immigration Reform: Scrambling to Coverfor Congress, SEATTLE TIMES, July 9,
2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htm/opinion/2003778001_riley09.html. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (1995 & Supp. 2008).
2. Dave Montgomery, Border Debate Grows Angrier, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER, Aug. 19, 2007, http://www.newsobserver.com/110/story/675575.html.
3. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
2006 STATE
LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRATION: ENACTED AND VETOED, http:/www.

ncsl.org/programs /immig/61mmigEnactedLegis3.htm (2006).
4. Id.
5. Julia Preston, Surge In Immigration Laws Around US., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/washington/06immig.html?_
r= 1&scp= 1&sq=august6,2007immigration&st=cse.
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Illegal immigration imposes a heavy burden upon cities and
states because they are forced to absorb the increased costs. 6 in
response to the suburban immigration influx, cites have begun to
enact municipal ordinances that attempt to reduce incentives for
illegal entrants to remain in their cities. The two types of
ordinances that prevail throughout the nation, and those that are
receiving the most criticism, are the so called tenancy provisions
and employer provisions."
The tenancy provisions attempt to rely upon federal
prohibitions against harboring illegal aliens by barring landlords
from renting residential property to illegal immigrants. The
procedures for enacting these ordinances differ slightly from city
to city, but in all cases a tenant is required to submit identity
documentation to either the landlord or the city that then retains the
information. If there is a valid complaint filed that alleges illegal
immigrants are being harbored, then the identity data is collected
and the legal status of the individual is verified with the federal
government. If the report verifies that the renter has an illegal
status, the city notifies the landlord. Thereafter, the landlord must
either evict the tenant or face repercussions: prohibition from
gathering rent and possible license revocation by city or state
officials.
In contrast, the employer provisions invoke local licensing
power, as provided to states and cities in United States Code Title
8, section 1324, to suspend or revoke business licenses from those
who employ illegal workers. 7 Pursuant to a valid complaint, a city
code enforcement officer obtains identity documentation from the
employer and verifies the worker's legal status with the federal
government. If the federal government reports that the applicant is
an illegal immigrant, the employer is thereafter required to fire the
employee or face license suspension or revocation.
6. See FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE COSTS TO LOCAL
TAXPAYERS FOR ILLEGAL OR "GUEST" WORKERS (2006), http://www.fairus.org/
site/PageServer?pagename=research localcosts. This study estimates that the
economic costs to cities of providing education, emergency medical care, and
incarceration to illegal immigrants is $36 million with the expectation that this
amount will rise to $61.5 million by 2010. This study also summarizes state
conducted studies of the impact of illegal immigration, with the following
results: Arizona: $1.3 billion (as of 2004), California: $10.5 billion (as of 2004),
Florida: $1.7 billion (as of 2005), New Jersey: $2.1 billion (as of 2006), New
York: $5.2 billion (as of 2006), Texas: $4.7 billion (as of 2005).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006), providing: "The provisions of this
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."
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These ordinances have been challenged as a violation of the
Supremacy Clause.8 Despite recent rulings, this Comment argues9
that employer provisions are not preempted by federal law.
Congress expressly reserved to states and cities the power to
revoke licenses for employers knowingly employing illegal
entrants. Therefore, states and cities are authorized to use their
inherent police power to protect their citizens. On the other hand,
this Comment argues that the tenancy provisions are likely
preempted and thus unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.
The tenancy provisions appear to constitute an attempt to institute
an alien registration system that imposes additional burdens upon
aliens that federal immigration policy does not and thus are
preempted. More generally, this Comment argues that not all state
or local ordinances that indirectly impact immigration issues are
preempted and examines the employer and tenancy ordinances as a
means to illustrate ordinances that are preempted and those that are
not. This Comment asserts that if an ordinance is to avoid being
preempted it must ensure the following criteria are met: (1) the
ordinance must utilize inherent police power to protect citizens; (2)
it must not undermine Congressional policy objectives; (3) it must
not conflict with federal law, nor may it impose additional burdens
upon aliens that Congress has not imposed; and (4) it must not
directly regulate aliens. If these factors are met, then legislation
that indirectly impacts immigration issues will not be preempted.
Part II of this Comment examines the current preemption
challenges to the ordinances by detailing the jurisprudential test
and the recent cases where this test has been applied. Part III
analyzes recent rulings and applies the three prong preemption test
as identified in DeCanas v. Bica to evaluate the constitutionality of
10
the employer provision and the illegality of tenancy ordinances.
The July 2007 decision in Lozano v. City of Hazleton is the most
in-depth court analysis of the preemption debate on these two
provisions and thus serves as a framework for the analysis. Part IV
is a brief examination of the policy concerns associated with state
and local ordinances. Part V provides recommendations for
creating legislation that both serves local interests in reducing the
negative effects of increased illegal immigration and withstands
constitutional scrutiny.
8. The ordinances have been challenged on several grounds such as due
process, equal protection, violation of the Contract Clause, as well as violations
under the Supremacy Clause. This Comment will only address the provisions
under a Supremacy Clause analysis.
9. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
10. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Supremacy Clause
Recent municipal ordinances that attempt to reduce the
negative impact of illegal immigration upon communities have
been declared invalid pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." The
Supreme Court created a three-prong preemption test in order to
determine whether federal law preempts and thus invalidates
subordinate government legislation: express preemption, conflict
preemption, and field preemption.12 If any prong of this test is met,
then the federal law will preempt the subordinate legislation.
Express preemption exists when federal law explicitly,
specifically, and expressly precludes state or local laws. If federal
law expressly precludes local concurrent regulation or
enforcement, then the local ordinance is invalid both statutorily
and constitutionally.' 3 Courts have found that the employer
provisions are expressly preemted reasoning that section 1324
prohibits concurrent legislation.
A statute is "conflict preempted" if it conflicts with federal law
and thus makes compliance with both state and federal law
impossible. 15 Conflict preemption also may occur if congressional
objectives or policy goals are undermined. Because a conflict
preemption analysis not only encompasses the express provisions
of the statute but also congressional objectives, which may be
vague and ambiguous, it is a difficult area to analyze.
Field preemption occurs when Congress has so pervasively
regulated within an area that there is no room left for states and
local governments to regulate or when Congress has expressly held
that the states are preempted. As described in Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, "field preemption exists where the federal regulatory
scheme is 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that
6
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.""
11. Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
12. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
13. Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 245 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2001).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
15. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000).
16. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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In determining whether the ordinances are preempted, the first
step is to establish whether the ordinances are regulating
immigration law or other local issues. Immigration regulation is an
exclusive power of the federal government and thus ordinances
that attempt to regulate in this area are inherently invalid under the
Supremacy Clause. The United States Supreme Court stated in
DeCanas v. Bica that only the federal government may issue "a
regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of
who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.' ' 7 However,
the Supreme Court also stated the following: "the Court has never
held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens
is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this
constitutional power, whether latent or exercised."' 8 Furthermore,
the Eastern District Court of Virginia stated:
it is the creation of standards for determining who is and is
not in this country legally that constitutes a regulation of
immigration in these circumstances, not whether a state's
determination in this regard results in the actual removal or
inadmissibility of any particular alien .... 19
Given the United States Supreme Court's ruling in DeCanas,
as well as the interpretation of this ruling by lower courts, it is
clear that state legislation or local ordinances, which indirectly
impact immigration policy, are not per se preempted. Nevertheless,
in Lozano v. City of Hazleton and in Farmer's Branch, the
respective courts found that the cities' attempts to regulate
businesses and rental properties were preempted because of the
impact that these ordinances place upon immigration policy.
Courts found that the local ordinances conflicted with federal
authority to exclusively regulate immigration policy.
B. Case Law: Municipal OrdinancesChallenged Upon Preemption
Grounds
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton
One of the earliest municipal ordinances taking aim at illegal
immigrants originated in the small city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania.
After declaring that illegal immigration increased crime and

17.
18.
19.

424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (emphasis added).
Id.
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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medical and education costs in the city, Hazleton passed two
ordinances aimed at reducing these expenses.
In its ordinance, Hazleton focused upon employers who
knowingly employ illegal immigrants. Ordinance 2006-18, the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (lIRA), authorized the city to
suspend the business license of an employer who either refuses to
verify an employee's legal status or who continues to employ the
illegal worker despite knowledge that the worker is illegally within
the country.20 The city also vowed to revoke licenses of property
20. Hazelton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance § 4 (July 13,
2006), providing:
A. It is unlawful for any business entity to recruit, hire for employment,
or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any person
who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or part within the
City. Every business entity that applies for a business permit to engage
in any type of work in the City shall sign an affidavit, prepared by the
City Solicitor, affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the services
or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall enforce
the requirements of this section.
(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written
signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted
by any City official, business entity, or City resident. A valid complaint
shall include an allegation which describes the alleged violator(s) as
well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date and location
where such actions occurred.
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation solely or primarily on the
basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and
shall not be enforced.
(3) Upon receipt of a valid complaint, the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office shall, within three business days, request identity information
from the business entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful
workers. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the
business permit of any business entity which fails, within three
business days after receipt of the request, to provide such information.
In instances where an unlawful worker is alleged to be an unauthorized
alien, as defined in United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3),
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit identity data
required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to United States
Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration status of such person(s),
and shall provide the business entity with written confirmation of that
verification.
(4) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the business
permit of any business entity which fails correct a violation of this
section within three business days after notification of the violation by
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.
The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall not suspend the business
permit of a business entity if, prior to the date of the violation, the
business entity had verified the work authorization of the alleged
unlawful worker(s) using the Basic Pilot Program.
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managers or property owners who rented dwelling units to illegal
(6) The suspension shall terminate one business day after a legal
representative of the business entity submits, at a City office designated
by the City Solicitor, a sworn affidavit stating that the violation has
ended.
(a) The affidavit shall include a description of the specific measures
and actions taken by the business entity to end the violation, and shall
include the name, address and other adequate identifying information
of the unlawful workers related to the complaint.
(b) Where two or more of the unlawful workers were verified by the
federal government to be unauthorized aliens, the legal representative
of the business entity shall submit to the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office, in addition to the prescribed affidavit, documentation
acceptable to the City Solicitor which confirms that the business entity
has enrolled in and will participate in the Basic Pilot Program for the
duration of the validity of the business permit granted to the business
entity.
(7) For a second or subsequent violation, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of a business
entity for a period of twenty days. After the end of the suspension
period, and upon receipt of the prescribed affidavit, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall reinstate the business permit. The Hazleton
Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit, complaint, and
associated documents to the appropriate federal enforcement agency,
pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373. In the case of an
unlawful worker disqualified by state law not related to immigration,
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit,
complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate state
enforcement agency.
C. All agencies of the City shall enroll and participate in the Basic Pilot
Program.
D. As a condition for the award of any City contract or grant to a
business entity for which the value of employment, labor or, personal
services shall exceed $10,000, the business entity shall provide
documentation confirming its enrollment and participation in the Basic
Pilot Program.
E. Private Cause of Action for Unfairly Discharged Employees
(1) The discharge of any employee who is not an unlawful worker by a
business entity in the City is unfair businesses practice if, on the date of
the discharge, the business entity was not participating in the Basic Pilot
program and the business entity was employing an unlawful worker.
(2) The discharged worker shall have a private cause of action in the
Municipal Court of Hazleton against the business entity for the unfair
business practice. The business entity found to have violated this
subsection shall be liable to the aggrieved employee for:
(a) three times the actual damages sustained by the employee, including
but not limited to lost wages or compensation from the date of the
discharge until the date the employee has procured new employment at
an equivalent rate of compensation, up to a period of one hundred and
twenty days; and
(b) reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
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immigrants.21 Under this tenancy provision, the city took aim at
those "harboring" illegal entrants. 2 Hazleton's ordinances were
21. Hazelton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance § 5 (July 13,
2006), providing:
A. It is unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling
unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, unless such harboring
is otherwise expressly permitted by federal law.
(1) For the purposes of this section, to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit
to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation
of law, shall be deemed to constitute harboring. To suffer or permit the
occupancy of the dwelling unit by an illegal alien, knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, shall also be deemed to
constitute harboring.
(2) A separate violation shall be deemed to have been committed on
each day that such harboring occurs, and for each adult illegal alien
harbored in the dwelling unit, beginning one business day after receipt
of a notice of violation from the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.
(3) A separate violation of this section shall be deemed to have been
committed for each business day on which the owner fails to provide
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office with identity data needed to
obtain a federal verification of immigration status, beginning three days
after the owner receives written notice from the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office.
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall enforce
the requirements of this section.
(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written
signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted
by any official, business entity, or resident of the City. A valid
complaint shall include an allegation which describes the alleged
violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and the date
and location where such actions occurred.
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation solely or primarily on the
basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and
shall not be enforced.
(3) Upon receipt of a valid written complaint, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code Title 8,
section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the immigration
status of a person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a dwelling unit
in the City. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit
identity data required by the federal government to verify immigration
status. The City shall forward identity data provided by the owner to
the federal government, and shall provide the property owner with
written confirmation of that verification.
(4) If after five business days following receipt of written notice from
the City that a violation has occurred and that the immigration status of
any alleged illegal alien has been verified, pursuant to United States
Code Title 8, section 1373(c), the owner of the dwelling unit fails to
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immediately challenged, and in July 2007 the Middle District
Court of Pennsylvania declared both ordinances unconstitutional.
The court declared the employer provision preempted on all three
prongs created under DeCanas: express, conflict, and field. 23 The
court also declared the tenancy provision conflict preempted. 24
The Lozano court held that section 1324 (IRCA) expressly
preempts Hazleton's ordinance because the license suspension or
revocation essentially amounts to a civil sanction. The court
reasoned that because the federal statute expressly preempts state
and local governments from imposing civil or criminal sanctions, it
also expressly preempts cities from suspending or revoking
licenses for employing illegal entrants. Despite this finding, the
Lozano court analyzed the ordinances under the other preemption
prongs.

correct a violation of this section, the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office shall deny or suspend the rental license of the dwelling unit.
(5) For the period of suspension, the owner of the dwelling unit shall
not be permitted to collect any rent, payment, fee, or any other form of
compensation from, or on behalf of, any tenant or occupant in the
dwelling unit.
(6) The denial or suspension shall terminate one business day after a
legal representative of the dwelling unit owner submits to the Hazleton
Code Enforcement Office a sworn affidavit stating that each and every
violation has ended. The affidavit shall include a description of the
specific measures and actions taken by the business entity to end the
violation, and shall include the name, address and other adequate
identifying information for the illegal aliens who were the subject of
the complaint.
(7) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit,
complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate federal
enforcement agency, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373.
(8) Any dwelling unit owner who commits a second or subsequent
violation of this section shall be subject to a fine of two hundred and
fifty dollars ($250) for each separate violation. The suspension
provisions of this section applicable to a first violation shall also apply.
(9) Upon the request of a dwelling unit owner, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code Title 8,
section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the lawful
immigration status of a person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a
dwelling unit in the City. The penalties in this section shall not apply in
the case of dwelling unit occupants whose status as an alien lawfully
present in the United States has been verified.
22. "Harboring" is defined as "[t]he act of affording lodging, shelter, or
refuge to a person, [especially] a criminal or illegal alien." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 733 (8th ed. 2004).
23. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477.
24. Id.
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The court analyzed field preemption, the second prong of the
preemption test, by focusing upon the federal interest and the
pervasiveness of federal immigration regulation. With respect to
federal interest, the court held the city's ordinance invalid
reasoning that Congress is constitutionally vested with the
authority to create uniform immigration policy and thus retains the
exclusive power to legislate on immigration matters. 2' In its
examination of the pervasiveness of the regulation, the court also
held that "IRCA is a 'comprehensive scheme' which therefore
leaves no room for state regulation." 26 It based its conclusion on
the fact that IRCA has explicit provisions that deal with the
employment of illegal workers. The court stated that "Congress has
indicated that one of the central features of federal immigration
policy is controlling the employment of unauthorized workers and
explains the manner in which an employer may be found liable for
violating the status and also how the employer can seek review of
adverse decisions. 27 The court found that federal law creates a
comprehensive program governing the employment of illegal
workers and thus a city or state is prohibited from enacting
legislation in this area. It is important to note that this holding
prevents a city or a state from adopting any legislation concerning
immigration even if the ordinance has the same objective and end
result as the federal statute, which is assumedly to deter illegal
immigration.
The final prong of the preemption analysis was conflict
preemption. The court found Hazleton's ordinance conflict
preempted reasoning that it conflicted with federal legislation and
with Congressional policy. First, the court held the ordinance
conflict preempted, because Hazleton authorized a code
enforcement officer to verify employee documentation with the
federal government while the federal scheme gave the employer
28
sole responsibility to examine legal status documentation.
Second, the court found Hazleton's ordinance was conflict
preempted, because it did not expressly release employers from the
verification of casual domestic employees or independent
25. Article I, Section 8 vests Congress with the power to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
27. Id.
28. A recent Associated Press story reported one illegal worker's response
to state ordinances which revoked employers' licenses. Velasquez, who worked
at a Phoenix grocery store, said he hadn't been asked to prove that he was in the
country legally, even though he had been working in the country for over one
year. See Some Fear Arizona Will Send Some Packing, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB.,
Sept. 12, 2007.
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contractors, which are not covered by the federal requirements.
Third, the court determined that Hazleton's ordinance imposed
"strict liability without the element of knowledge" and thereby
conflicted with federal law, which contains a knowledge
requirement. The fourth conflict the court found was Hazleton's
requirement that all city agencies participate in the Basic Pilot
Program while the federal program made the Basic Pilot Program
voluntary. Fifth, the court found that the difference in time frames
between the city ordinance and federal law also created a conflict.
Under the federal statute, an employer may not terminate an
employee for at least ten days while the legal status of the employee
is being determined. The Hazleton ordinance, on the other hand,
suspends the license of the employer within three days after the
employer is officially notified of the employee's illegal status. Sixth,
the court found the appeals process between the federal statute and
the local ordinance were in conflict. Hazelton's ordinance did not
expressly provide an appeal to the employee but rather allowed the
employer to appeal. In contrast, the federal law provided this appeal
right directly to the employee. Seventh, the court found that the
Hazleton ordinance conflicted with federal policy objectives. The
court reasoned that "[t]oo stringent of an enforcement system will
result in the wrongful removal of United States citizens and legal
immigrants." 29 The court also cited the following policy reasons for
its finding that the two laws were in conflict: "Excessive
enforcement jeopardizes our alliances and cooperation with regard
to matters such as immigration enforcement, drug interdiction and
counter-terrorism investigations., 30 The Lozano court also
determined that the Hazleton ordinance lacked an antidiscrimination
clause which the federal statute contains and thus was in conflict
with federal objectives.
The court invalidated the tenancy provision finding the
ordinance conflict preempted. The court based its decision upon
two grounds. First, the ordinances "[a]ssume that the federal
government seeks the removal of all undocumented aliens.,, 31 The
court examined the federal illegal alien deportation process and
concluded that the system was complex and thus unable to be
reduced to concrete rules of deportation. The court found the
federal government may allow an alien to remain in the nation
despite an illegal status. Upon these grounds the court determined
that Hazleton's method of determining legal status was inadequate.
Second, the court found that the city's ordinance imposed a burden
29. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 532.
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upon aliens that federal policy did not because it restricted an
alien's potential regional residences. The court found that these
flaws in the ordinance not only directly imposed burdens upon
aliens but also functioned in such as manner as to allow the city to
regulate immigration policy. For these reasons the court rendered
the ordinance invalid. Therefore, similar to the employer
provisions, the tenancy provisions were also deemed to be conflict
preempted.
2. Valley Park,Missouri
Hazleton was not alone in enacting these types of municipal
ordinances; Valley Park, Missouri also enacted both employer and
tenancy provisions that nearly mirror Hazleton's. 32 Similarly to
Hazleton, Valley Park aimed to eliminate the harboring of illegal
entrants by targeting landlords. Section 5(b)(5) of the ordinance
authorizes the city to revoke the occupancy permit for a property
owner or manager who knowingly rents units to illegal entrants.
The Eastern District Court of Missouri did not address the merits
of the preemption challenge34 but rather remanded the case due to a
lack of federal jurisdiction.

3. FarmersBranch, Texas
In a tenancy ordinance that differs slightly from Valley Park's
and Hazleton's, the city of Farmers Branch, Texas requires
property managers to request and review original documents of
eligible citizenship or immigration status. 35 The Northern District
32. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1708 § 4(b)(4) (July 17, 2006)
provides the following: "The Valley Park Code Enforcement Officer shall
suspend the business license of any business entity which fails to correct a
violation of this section within three (3) business days after notification of the
violation by the Valley Park Code Enforcement Office."
33. Section 5(b)(5) provides:
For the period of suspension, the owner of the dwelling unit shall not
be permitted to collect any rent, payment fee, or another form of
compensation from, or on behalf of any tenant or occupant in the
dwelling unit. In addition, the City of Valley Park shall not issue
occupancy permits for any properties owned during the suspension
period.
Id.
34. Reynolds v. Valley Park, No. 4:06CV01487 ERW, 2006 WL 3331082,
at *8 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006). In remanding the case the court did state that
Plaintiffs are "[c]hallenging the validity of a local ordinance . . . they do not
state a claim under federal law... ." Id.
35. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2892 (repealed 2006), providing:
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of Texas found the ordinance preempted reasoning that the city was
36
"doing more than adopting federal immigration requirements."
The court based its determination upon the fact that the ordinance
did not use federal immigration standards for defining who was a
noncitizen but rather used Housing and
Urban Development benefit
7
guidelines to determine legal status.

The owner and/or property manager shall require as a prerequisite to
entering into any lease or rental arrangement, including any lease or
rental renewals or extensions, the submission of evidence of citizenship
or eligible immigration status for each tenant family consistent with
subsection (3).
(3) Evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status.
Each family member, regardless of age, must submit the following
evidence to the owner and/or property manager.
i. For U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals, the evidence consists of a signed
declaration of U.S. citizenship or U.S. nationality. The verification of
the declaration shall be confirmed by requiring presentation of a United
States passport or other appropriate documentation in a form designated
by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department ("ICE") as
acceptable evidence of citizenship status.
ii. For all other non-citizens, the evidence consists of
a. A signed declaration of eligible immigration status;
b. A form designated by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department ("ICE") as acceptable evidence of immigration status; and
c. A signed verification consent form.
(4) General.
i. The owner and/or property manager shall request and review original
documents of eligible citizenship or immigration status. The owner
and/or property manager shall retain photocopies of the documents for
its own records and return the original documents to the family. Copies
shall be retained by the owner and/or property manager for a period of
not less than two (2) years after the end of the family's lease or rental.
ii. For each family member, the family shall be required to submit
evidence of citizenship or immigration status only once during
continuous occupancy. The owner and/or property manager is
prohibited from allowing the occupancy of any unit by any family
which has not submitted the required evidence of citizens.
36. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d
757, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
37. The Department of Housing and Urban Development is a federal agency
whose mission is to "[i]ncrease homeownership, support community
development and increase access to affordable housing free from
discrimination." U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.: HUD's Mission,
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/hudmission.cfm (last visited Feb. 27,
2009). Rather than using ICE guidelines, Valley Park attempted to use HUD
guidelines, which determine subsidies for noncitizens, as the city's guideline
differentiating between legal or illegal aliens.
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4. Arizona
More recently, in July 2007 Arizona enacted legislation which
forces employers who are licensed by the state of Arizona to enroll
in the federal Basic Pilot Program. 38 Additionally, the state
legislation allows for suspension and revocation of licenses if
employers knowingly or with reckless disregard persistently hire
and employ illegal immigrants. 39 Arizona's statute differs from
38. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, the Basic Pilot
Program is a voluntary federal program expanded by Congress in 2004 that
allows employers to verify their employees' legal status. Participating employers
submit 1-9 information to the Department of Homeland Security within three
days of hiring the employee. The Department of Homeland Security then
transmits the data to the Social Security Administration who in turns verifies the
legitimacy of the documents. The employer is then given verification of the
employee's legal status and if the employee does not contest the report the
employer must terminate the employee. JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION:
FEDERAL BASIC PILOT PROGRAM IS AN EFFECTIVE AND EMPLOYER-FRIENDLY
TOOL FOR IMMIGRATION LAW COMPLIANCE (2006), http://www.cis.org/articles/

2006/jmvtestimony022106.html.
39.

ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (1995 & Supp. 2008), providing:

Employment of unauthorized aliens; prohibition; false and frivolous
complaints; violation; classification; license suspension and revocation;
affirmative defense.
A. An employer shall not intentionally employ an unauthorized alien or
knowingly employ an unauthorized alien. B. On receipt of a complaint
that an employer allegedly intentionally employs an unauthorized alien
or knowingly employs an unauthorized alien, the attorney general or
county attorney shall investigate whether the employer has violated
subsection A. When investigating a complaint, the attorney general or
county attorney shall verify the work authorization of the alleged
unauthorized alien with the federal government pursuant to 8 United
States Code § 1373(c). A state, county or local official shall not attempt
to independently make a final determination on whether an alien is
authorized to work in the United States. An alien's immigration status
or work authorization status shall be verified with the federal
government pursuant to 8 United States Code § 1373(c). A person who
knowingly files a false and frivolous complaint under this subsection is
guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor.
C. If, after an investigation, the attorney general or county attorney
determines that the complaint is not frivolous:
1. the attorney general or county attorney shall notify the United States
immigration and customs enforcement of the unauthorized alien.
2. The attorney general or county attorney shall notify the local law
enforcement agency of the unauthorized alien.
3. The attorney general shall notify the appropriate county attorney to
bring an action pursuant to subsection D if the complaint was originally
filed with the attorney general.
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F. On a finding of a violation of subsection A:
1. For a first violation during a three year period that is a knowing
violation of subsection A, the court:
(a) shall order the employer to terminate the employment of all
unauthorized aliens.
(b) Shall order the employer to be subject to a three year probationary
period. During the probationary period the employer shall file quarterly
reports with the county attorney of each new employee who is hired by
the employer at the specific location where the unauthorized alien
performed work.
(c) Shall order the employer to file a signed sworn affidavit with the
county attorney within three business days after the order is issued. The
affidavit shall state that the employer has terminated the employment of
all unauthorized aliens and that the employer will not intentionally or
knowingly employ an unauthorized alien. The court shall order the
appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses subject to this subdivision
that are held by the employer if the employer fails to file a signed
sworn affidavit with the county attorney within three business days
after the order is issued. All licenses that are suspended under this
subdivision shall remain suspended until the employer files a signed
sworn affidavit with the county attorney.
(d) May order the appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses
described in subdivision (c) of this paragraph that are held by the
employer for not to exceed ten business days. The court shall base its
decision to suspend under this subdivision on any evidence or
information submitted to it during the action for a violation of this
subsection and shall consider the following factors, if relevant:
(i) The number of unauthorized aliens employed by the employer.
(ii) Any prior misconduct by the employer.
(iii) the degree of harm resulting from the violation.
(iv) Whether the employer made good faith efforts to comply with any
applicable requirements.
(v) The duration of the violation.
(vi) The role of the directors, officers or principals of the employer in
the violation.
(vii) any other factors the court deems appropriate.
2. For a first violation during a five year period that is an intentional
violation of subsection A, the court shall:
(a) Order the employer to terminate the employment of all unauthorized
aliens.
(b) Order the employer to be subject to a five year probationary period.
During the probationary period the employer shall file quarterly reports
with the county attorney of each new employee who is hired by the
employer at the specific location where the unauthorized alien
performed work.
3. For a second violation of subsection A during the period of
probation, the court shall order the appropriate agencies to permanently
revoke all licenses that are held by the employer and that are necessary
to operate the employer's business at the employer's business location
where the unauthorized alien performed work. If a license is not
necessary to operate the employer's business at the specific location
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Valley Park, Farmers Branch, and Hazleton in two key ways: the
Arizona statute is specific and unambiguous. For example, the
statute expressly states the following: "A state, county, or local
official shall not attempt to independently make a final
determination on whether an alien is authorized to work in the
United States." Arizona's express restriction on independent
determinations by state officials thus attempts to reduce ambiguity
and thereby avoid a constitutional attack. Additionally, Arizona's
statute cites to United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c) four
times in the two page statute. 40 This reliance upon the federal
statute appears to be an obvious attempt to prove that the State is
not attempting to independently regulate immigration matters. 4'
It is important to note that the preceding statutes are mere
examples of ordinances and legislation that cities and states have
promulgated in their attempts to mitigate the economic and social
costs associated with illegal immigration. There are numerous
other ordinances that have arisen, such as English-only ordinances,
state legislation that authorizes ID card issuance to illegal
immigrants, and state restrictions for student financial aid to illegal
aliens. Cities and states will undoubtedly continue to utilize their
police powers to enact not only these provisions, but variations of
them as well. Confusion, frustration, and discontent will continue
to escalate until this issue is resolved.

where the unauthorized alien performed work, but a license is
necessary to operate the employer's business in general, the court shall
order the appropriate agencies to permanently revoke all licenses that
are held by the employer at the employer's primary place of business.
On receipt of the order and notwithstanding any other law, the
appropriate agencies shall immediately revoke the licenses.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006). Explaining the obligation to respond to
inquiries, this section provides:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry
by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or
ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within
the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by
providing the requested verification or status information.
41. Arizona's statute was immediately challenged upon preemption
grounds. The U.S. District Court in Arizona upheld the statute and upon appeal
the United States's Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's holding. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th
Cir. 2009).
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III. ANALYSIS
The Lozano decision has been the most comprehensive judicial
analysis of the preemption debate on the tenancy and employer
provisions; thus, this Comment uses that decision as a framework
for the preemption analysis. The following Section applies each
prong of the preemption test, as defined in DeCanas v. Bica, to the
employer and tenancy provisions to illustrate that employer
provisions are valid because they do not violate any prong of the
three part test.4 2 This Section also illustrates that the tenancy
provisions are invalid because they fail both the conflict and field
preemption tests. The distinctions between the employer provisions
and the tenancy provisions serve as a frame for identifying those
components which render them either valid or invalid.
A. Employer ProvisionsAnalysis
1. Express Preemption
Local ordinances that suspend or revoke the business licenses
of employers who knowingly or with reckless disregard employ
illegal immigrants are not preempted but rather are expressly
authorized by Congress. In support of this contention is the plain
language of United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(2),
which preempts state or local laws except licensing. Subsection
1324a(h)(2) provides the following: "[T]he provisions of this
section preempt any State or local laws imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, ' or3 recruit, or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens. A
Thus, although the statute expressly preempts states from
imposing civil or criminal sanctions, the plain language of
subsection 1324a(h)(2) provides that states and local governments
may regulate the licenses of those who employ, recruit, or refer for
a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.
Despite the statute's plain language, courts have refused to
allow local governments to utilize their licensing authority. For
instance, the Lozano court insisted that allowing the city to revoke
business licenses for violating federal law would violate Congress'
central control over illegal immigrant workers. 44 Clearly, Congress
42.
43.

DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1975).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).

44. The Lozano court stated: "Immigration is a national issue. The United
States Congress has provided complete and thorough regulations with regard to
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intended for central control, but this was not its only intent as
illustrated by the plain language of the statute as well as
congressional records. House reports, as examined in Lozano v.
City of Hazleton, uncovered that Congress' intent regarding local
government control of licensing was exactly as the plain meaning
of the statute indicated. House Report No. 99-682(I) provides the
following insight:
[T]he penalties contained in this legislation are interpreted
to specifically preempt any state or local laws providing
civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring,
recruitment, or referral of undocumented aliens. They are
not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local
processes concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal
to reissue a license to any person who has been found45to
have violated the sanctionsprovisions in this legislation.
Declaring the employer ordinances expressly preempted
ignores the plain language and meaning of the statue. Further, this
holding disregards the congressional report, which is directly
contrary. Given the plain language of the statute coupled with the
House Report, it seems clear that Congress' intent was to expressly
preserve state and local control over businesses.
Despite the plain meaning, the Lozano court found that
Congress did not intend for subordinate governments to retain the
right to revoke business licenses. This court held the following:
"[I]n the instant case, Hazleton suspends the business permit of
those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate IRCA.
Thus, the licensing exception to State and local preemption is not
applicable. ' 46 The court's analysis is an attempt to bifurcate the
federal and local laws so that violation of one does not necessarily
violate the other. This reasoning is flawed because it fails to
recognize that the municipal ordinance is but a local reinforcement
of federal law. The court's decision essentially asserts that states
and cities are not authorized to ensure that its businesses obey
federal law. At its core, this holding asserts that the state and city
cannot create its own laws to protect its own local interest, a local
interest that also ensures that federal law is followed. Additionally,

the employment of unauthorized aliens including anti-immigration discrimination
provisions. Allowing States or local governments to legislate with regard to the
employment of unauthorized aliens would interfere with Congressional
objectives." 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 523-24 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
45. H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 5661 (1986) (emphasis added).
46. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
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the court's holding attempts to minimize the inherent power of
states and cities to exercise their police powers. Traditionally,
states and cities have had the inherent police authority to protect its
citizens and regulate businesses, and the court's holding essentially
prohibits cities from doing so.
In contrast to Lozano, a Louisiana State Court of Appeal
addressed a similar issue in a case nearly twenty years ago. In
1988, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal decided Garcia
v. State, which involved an employer who knowingly employed
eight illegal immigrant workers.4 7 Louisiana state law prohibited
employers from knowingly employing illegal aliens and imposed a
civil fine upon conviction. Garcia challenged the fine arguing that
the state law was preempted; the first circuit disagreed and ruled
that the law was valid. The court, citing to DeCanas v. Bica, held
that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not
render the statute a regulation of immigration., 4 8 Additionally, the
court held that "Louisiana's provisions merely contain those police
powers of the states 'to regulate the employment relationship to
protect workers within the state.'4 9 Garciais significant because it
illustrates judicial interpretation of the illegal immigration
preemption analysis intertwined with state police powers in the
wake of DeCanas and soon after the promulgation of the 1986
section 1324. In short, Garcia demonstrates states' interpretation
of the Supreme Court's DeCanas ruling and new immigration
statutes immediately following their promulgation. Garcia
illustrates that subordinate governments have always believed it to
be within their police powers to regulate local businesses, and
courts have supported this contention. Furthermore, Garciaclearly
and unequivocally held that state legislation which mirrors federal
law, with the purpose to protect its workers and citizens, is not
preempted but rather is a valid use of state police powers.
It is important to note that state and local laws that do not
conflict with federal law or objectives are not preempted, but those
ordinances that have a legitimate purpose are a valid exercise of
police powers. This is not a new concept and, as Garciaillustrates,
has been respected even in the controversial arena of illegal
immigration. Therefore, an ordinance is valid if it utilizes police
powers to enforce business license suspension, in accordance with
the power expressly reserved to it pursuant to section 1324.

47. 521 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
48. Id.at 613.
49. Id.at 614.
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2. FieldPreemption
The employer provisions do not attempt to directly regulate
immigrants; thus, an argument that they are regulating immigration
policy is flawed. No ordinance previously discussed attempts to
create standards for determining whether someone is legally or
illegally in the nation. Rather, the ordinances rely upon a federal
determination of legal status before a city takes any action. Even
after a local government receives federal notification that an
employee is illegally working in the city, the only action that the
city takes is to suspend the local business's license. As applied to
employers, the ordinances discussed strictly adhere to federal law
and standards in their enforcement. The city takes no direct action
against the illegal worker and therefore the ordinance is not an
attempt to regulate immigration policy. If any ordinance attempts
to regulate immigration policy, it will be invalid; Congress
completely occupies this field thereby preempting any state law or
municipal ordinance that attempts to concurrently regulate
immigration. Thus, in determining whether the ordinances are field
preempted, the first step must be to determine whether they
regulate immigration at all.
The Lozano court reasoned that the ordinances regulate
immigration because local code enforcement officers are required
to make independent immigration status determinations. However,
the ordinances do no such thing; rather, they explicitly require the
code enforcement officer to obtain immigration status documents
and then verify them with the federal government. 50 It is only after
the city receives a report that an employee is an illegal immigrant
that an employer is given three days to remedy the situation. The
ordinance does not seem to divest any authority to the code
enforcement officer to independently determine immigration
status. Thus, the allegation that the code enforcement officer is
unilaterally determining immigration status is unfounded.
Critics attacking these ordinances are not alleging that they are
vague or ambiguous but rather argue that code enforcement
officers are turned into de facto renegade and self-deputized
50. Hazleton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance § 4B3 (July 16,
2006), providing:
In instances where an unlawful worker is alleged to be an unauthorized
alien, as defined in United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3),
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Officer shall submit identity data
required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to United States
Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration status of such person(s),
and shall provide the business entity with written confirmation of that
verification.

1010

0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

immigration officials. The ordinances may not be the best written
legislation, but it is clear that no code enforcement officer can
independently make the decision to declare an employee illegal.
The employment ordinance requires that after a valid complaint5 '
is filed with the city, an employer must submit documentation to a
city code enforcement officer, who then verifies the employee's
status with federal agencies; there is no independent determination
being made by any city official.52 The Court's DeCanas ruling
indicates that unless there is a strong showing of Congressional
intent to oust concurrent legislation, state or local ordinances that
indirectly impact immigration policy will not be preempted. In the
instant matter, current federal legislation does not indicate
congressional intent to prohibit state and local governments from
suspending business licenses. 53 In fact, the Lozano court was
forced to find that the license revocation was the "ultimate
sanction" in order to circumvent the express the statutory language
that reserved the licensing authority to cities and states.
The Lozano holding ignores the obvious exception that
Congress provided to the states to retain their ability to revoke,
renew, suspend, or reissue licenses for business. If Congress had
intended to fully preempt any subordinate government sanctions
upon employers who employ illegal immigrants, then it is unlikely
that this express exception would have been included.
Additionally, this exception may be Congress's acknowledgment
that cities and states have inherent control and authority over local

51. Id. § 4B2, providing: "A complaint which alleges a violation solely or
primarily on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed
invalid and shall not be enforced."
52. Id. § 4B3, providing:
Upon receipt of a valid complaint, the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office shall, within three business days, request identity information
from the business entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful
workers. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the
business permit of any business entity which fails, within three
business days after receipt of the request, to provide such information.
In instances where an unlawful worker is alleged to be an unauthorized
alien, as defined in United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3),
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit identity data
required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to United States
Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration status of such person(s),
and shall provide the business entity with written confirmation of that
verification.
53. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006), entitled Preemption, providing:
The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those
who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.
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businesses because of their potential effects upon the local
community.
The employer provisions do not impose criminal or civil
penalties directly upon immigrants but rather take aim at the
licenses of local businesses who profit by violating federal law and
imparting the costs of their trespasses upon the local community.
The cities initially issue business licenses, and they subsequently
monitor, revoke, reissue, or suspend licenses for violating any of a
number of ordinances or laws. Thus, although the ordinances may
indirectly touch upon immigration issues, the ordinances are
regulations of local businesses and local interests. Congress has not
pervasively regulated local business licenses nor has Congress
mandated a federal policy or program that restricts business
licenses for those employing illegal immigrants; rather, Congress
has expressly provided that
54 subordinate governments should
licenses.
regulate
to
continue
States and cities have inherent police powers to protect their
citizens. These police powers are not suspended simply because
Congress regulates in a particular area. As a general rule, Congress
has exclusive authority over interstate commerce, while
corporation and business law are essentially within the states'
domain. Similarly, interstate commerce is the most pervasively
regulated area in the exclusive domain of Congress; however, state
and local ordinances are not per se preempted simply because
Congress has created intricate regulation in the field. State and
local ordinances that do not present undue or unjustified burdens
upon interstate commerce are not per se preempted.
If the Commerce Clause analysis is applied to the local
ordinances, then it seems clear that they are not preempted. The
employment ordinances do not present an undue burden that
clearly exceeds the benefits to the cities. The cities are supporting
the increased expenses resulting from an influx of immigrants, so
they have a significant interest in addressing illegal immigration.
Thus, the states and cities are fully empowered to ensure that
businesses within their jurisdictions are not imposing undue harm
upon the community.
Cities and states issue, suspend, or revoke business licenses for
a number of different reasons. A city that suspends a restaurant or
bar's liquor license as a result of persistent violations is exercising
its inherent police power to protect its citizens. This is very similar
to the instant matter, as the states and cities are claiming legitimate
harm to their communities as a result of employers deliberately and
repeatedly violating federal law; the local ordinances do not
54. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
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attempt to undermine any uniform national standards.
Additionally, Congress has not pervasively regulated the issuance
of licenses to businesses that employ illegal entrants. Therefore,
cities and states are not preempted by federal law from regulating
business licenses.
This analysis illustrates that the employer provisions are valid
because Congress has not intended to oust state or local control
over the issuance, suspension, or revocation of business licenses.
Additionally, Supreme Court jurisprudence does not indicate that
local governments are restricted from regulating their own
communities because local ordinances may potentially impact
illegal immigration; in fact, it is quite the opposite. Congress and
the Supreme Court recognize that local governments must regulate
local concerns and are authorized to do so unless there is an intent
to remove them from either the larger field of total immigration
policy or the smaller field of business licenses; in this case, there is
no evidence of this intent and thus these types of employer
provisions are authorized.
3. Conflict Preemption
The municipal employer provisions do not conflict with the
federal statute or congressional objectives but rather further
Congressional purpose by deterring the employment of illegal
entrants. The Supreme Court held that local law is presumed valid
and is only preempted when the federal scheme is undermined by
the local law. 55 The Court stated the following in DeCanas v. Bica:
[C]onflicting law absent repealing or exclusivity provisions
should be preempted . . . only to the extent necessary to
protect the achievement of the aims of the federal law,
55. Examples of local ordinances that are clearly conflict preempted are
sanctuary cities. In stark contrast to municipalities that attempt to enforce federal
law are the abundance of sanctuary cities that continue to grow in the face of
increased federal enforcement. Self-declared sanctuary cities or states are those
that openly prohibit city employees from inquiring into the legal status of people
and also restrict information sharing about illegal immigrants with federal
authorities. Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations:
Innocuous Symbolism Or Improper Dictates?, 16 Pepp. L. Rev. 297 (1989);
Ruben Navarrette, Commentary: Don't Confuse Immigrant Victims with Villains,
CNN, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/04/navarrette.
immigration/index.html. These cities openly flout federal laws which prohibit the
knowing harboring or employment of illegal aliens. These sanctuary cities have
not faced constitutional challenge despite their intentional interference with and
violation of federal law. Additionally, these laws are seemingly preempted by their
express conflict with federal law, yet they continue to thrive unchallenged.
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since the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of
both statutory schemes with one another
56 rather than holding
the [state scheme] completely ousted.
Federal law provides criminal and civil sanctions for
knowingly or with reckless disregard employing an illegal
immigrant. The state and local ordinances simply utilize their
inherent power, which Congress reserved to them in its saving
clause, to suspend and revoke licenses for repeated violations of
section 1324. Thus, the local ordinances and the federal statute are
simply two sides of the same coin, which have the same purpose
and the same effect: preventing the employment of illegal workers.
Traditionally, local laws have withstood scrutiny if they do not add
to or conflict with the federal law and thus allow compliance with
both; this is illustrated in the recent immigration case of Incalza v.
Fendi North America.
In Incalza, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
California law after determining that both federal and state
57
requirements and objectives could simultaneously be achieved.
Incalza is significant for two reasons. First, it illustrates the court's
adherence to the long standing presumption that ordinances are
valid and are not preempted. Second, it demonstrates that a state
law that differs from federal law is not per se preempted. If the
Incalza reasoning is applied to the instant matter, it seems clear
that the employer provisions do not conflict with federal
legislation.
Incalza involved California law that created a cause of action
for all workers who were terminated if there had been an express
or implied agreement that they would not be discharged without
good cause.5 California's law applied equally to illegal entrants as
well as citizens and resident aliens. In contrast, subsection
1324a(a)(2) makes it illegal "after hiring an alien for employment
in accordance with [the Act] to continue to employ the alien in the
United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an
unauthorized alien with respect to such employment." 59 Thus, the
issue was whether the state law conflicted with federal law and
was thereby preempted; the Ninth Circuit held that it was not. The
court found that federal law permitted an employer to suspend an
illegal worker while the employee attempted to rectify his
immigration status. In short, the Ninth Circuit found that it was
possible to comply with both the state and federal laws without
56. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.5 (1976).
57.

479 F.3d 1005.

58. Id.
59.

8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (2007).
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violating either one and thus interpreted the construction of the two
statutes in such a fashion that the state law was upheld and the
federal statute was not undermined.
In Incaza, the California statute openly creates a conflict
between the state and federal laws. Nevertheless, the Incaza court
upheld the state law because it is possible to construe California's
law so that it is not in conflict with section 1324.60 In the instant
matter, it is not necessary to engage in the type of statute
interpretation conducted in Incalza in order to find both statutes
valid because the immigration ordinances mirror federal statutes.
In contrast to the presumption of constitutionality applied in
Incaza, the Lozano court found that Hazleton's employer
ordinance was conflict preempted in seven different areas. One
area was the knowledge requirement. The court found that
Hazleton's ordinance imposed strict liability on employers of
illegal workers as opposed to the federal statute, which contains a
knowledge requirement. 6 1 This argument simply overlooks the
procedures of the local ordinances. First, if the employer
voluntarily enrolls in the federal Basic Pilot Program then he is not
subject to local code enforcement. Second, the local ordinances
require that the employer provide documentation to the code
enforcement officer upon receipt of a valid complaint. If it is
determined that the immigrant is illegally within the United States
after verifying the immigration status with the federal government,
the employer is notified of the violation, which means that he now
has knowledge of his offense. He has knowledge of the illegal
status because the code enforcement officer has verified the
worker's status with the federal government and has thereafter
transmitted this information to the employer. Therefore, the federal
requirement that an employer must be found to have "knowingly or
with reckless disregard employed an illegal worker" is met.
The Lozano court also found that the Hazleton ordinance
conflicts with federal law because the local law requires a code
enforcement officer to retrieve status documents from an employer
and then verify the employee's legal status with the federal
government. 62 Federal law, on the other hand, requires an
employer to examine the documents and requires the employee to
fill out an 1-9 form, which is then transmitted to the federal
government for verification. It is essential to understand the
procedure under which these municipal ordinances operate. First, a
code enforcement officer only seeks verification from the
60. Incaiza, 479 F.3d at 1013.
61. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
62. Id.
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employer about an employee's legal status after a valid complaint
has been filed. At this point the city code enforcement officer
simply takes copies of the documents and verifies the authenticity
with the federal government. Inserting the code enforcement
officer into the mix does not release the employer from his
federally mandated duty to inquire into his employee's legal status;
thus, there is no conflict. Therefore, because employers can satisfy
both federal and state or local law, the ordinances are not
preempted.
The Lozano court held that Hazleton's ordinance also
conflicted with federal law because the city required all city
agencies to participate in the Basic Pilot Program. This ruling fails
to consider the Tenth Amendment, which prohibits the federal
government from commandeering state or local officials to carry
out federal policy or administrative programs. 6 3 In short, the
federal Basic Pilot Program can be nothing but voluntary because
of the limitations imposed by the Tenth Amendment; however, the
Tenth Amendment does not limit state and local governments from
requiring their own agencies to participate in the program without
violating any constitutional provision. Therefore, the court erred in
its determination that a local law that requires participation in the
federal Basic Pilot Program conflicts with the federal objectives
that are purely voluntarily.
The Lozano court held that the local ordinance conflicted with
federal law because the city did not provide an appeals process to
the employee but rather only to the employer; however, this does
not render the ordinance invalid.6 4 The city cannot directly regulate
the illegal entrant because Congress has pervasively regulated in
this field. Congress has already provided the means for the worker
to appeal his illegal status and thus the city is unable to create
concurrent legislation in this field. Cities can only regulate local
business licenses because this is the area that Congress has
expressly reserved for local control; therefore, the city is only
authorized to provide an appeals process for the employer. The
Hazleton ordinance does not deprive the employee of his appeal
rights because he still retains these rights under the federal law.
The Lozano court also found Hazleton's ordinance conflict
preempted because it did not contain an anti-discrimination

63. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. X, providing: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
64. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
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provision, which is present in federal law. 65 The city's ordinance
does mandate, however, that a complaint based solely upon race or
nationality is not valid and will not be investigated by the city.
Therefore, the city did attempt to discourage discriminatory
reporting and complaints.
Conflict preemption may also occur if a state or local ordinance
is more burdensome than its federal counterpart. In Hines v.
Davidowitz, the United States Supreme Court held that a state or
local government cannot impose continuing burdens upon aliens
that are not contemplated within the federal plan.66 Upon these
grounds, opponents may argue that requiring immigrants to supply
immigration status to a code enforcement officer is unduly
burdensome. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the employer should already have copies of his
employee's identification documentation as well as a federal 1-9
form when the employee was hired. Additionally, the ordinances
require that the employee submit his proof of legal immigration
status directly to his employer who retains copies of this
information. Therefore, if there is a valid complaint concerning the
employee's legal status, the employee is not even aware that an
investigation is being conducted, and consequently there is no
burden upon him.
Second, the employer ordinances do not require the employer
or the employee to do anything except submit information to a
code enforcement officer; this makes this process even less
burdensome than the Basic Pilot Program. The Center for
Immigration Studies reported the results of a Department of
Homeland Security survey which attempted to gauge the impact
that the Basic Pilot Program would have upon employers. The
assessment revealed that "92% of employers thought that the
verification process did not overburden their staff' and "93% of
employers thought Basic Pilot Program was easier than the
existing 1-9 process. ' 67 Thus, the employer ordinance does not
impose an additional burden upon either employers or employees
that would render it conflict preempted. As stated in Equal Access
Board of Education v. Merten, "There is no Supremacy Clause bar
to state officials' examination of an applicant's federal
immigration documentation to confirm the applicant's selfreported immigration status." 68 There are no additional burdens
65. Id. at 529.
66. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
67. VAUGHAN, supra note 38.
68. Equal Access Bd. of Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 n.8
(E.D. Va. 1994).
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upon either the worker or the employer simply because the
employer may have to verify that he is complying with federal law
and also thereby verify that he is not injuring his local community.
B. Tenancy ProvisionsAnalysis
Municipalities have attempted to rely upon the anti-harboring
provision in federal law, which imposes criminal penalties for the
harboring of illegal immigrants, to enact ordinances that prohibit the
leasing of residential property to illegal immigrants. 69 The
ordinances revoke the license of property managers and prevent the
owner from receiving rent for the unit while the violation continues.
The ordinances take aim at property managers who knowingly
allow an illegal entrant to reside in a dwelling unit unless expressly
permitted by federal law. These provisions sanction the property
manager and property owner who are aware of the illegal status of
his tenants but choose to allow the occupants to remain in the
unit.7 ° If a property manager continues to allow the tenant to
remain after being notified of the tenant's illegal status, the
manager is deemed to be harboring the family and is therefore in
violation of section 1324.71 The tenancy provisions are conflict and
field preempted because they potentially impose burdens not only
upon aliens but also upon other cities and states. These types of
ordinances impose residency conditions and restrictions that are
beyond those contemplated by the federal government.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2007). This section prohibits the following:
[A]ny person who knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the US in violation of law,
conceals, harbors, or shields from detection or attempts to conceal,
harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any
building or any means of transportation.
70. See United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 995 (1975) (holding that harboring, under the federal statute, included
allowing a known illegal alien to remain in an apartment). The Lopez court
stated the following:
Although "harbor" has been defined to have several meanings,
including "to receive clandestinely and conceal," its primary meaning
is "to give shelter or refuge to". At the time of the conduct forming the
basis of the charges against Lopez it was readily apparent, as the
Supreme Court had noted in Evans, that the term "harbor" might
reasonably be construed to encompass the providing of shelter to illegal
aliens, unconnected with the smuggling of them into the United States.
Lopez, therefore, had fair warning that his conduct might be held to
violate § 1324, even if that statute were construed along the lines now
advocated by him.
Id. at 441 (citations omitted).
71. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22 (defining "harboring").
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1. FieldPreemption
The tenancy provisions are more vulnerable to constitutional
challenge upon grounds that they regulate immigration. The
tenancy provisions potentially prohibit both legal and illegal
immigrants from residing in the city. In essence, these ordinances
could potentially close off an entire region from immigrants and in
a sense create a kind of local deportation, which is an exclusive
right of Congress. If the effect of the ordinances were a local
deportation, then it is likely that the ordinance would be preempted
on grounds that the municipalities were attempting to regulate
immigration. Valley Park's ordinance does subordinate itself to
any federal law, which allows the illegal to remain despite an
illegal status "unless such harboring is expressly permitted by
federal law. ''"2 This is a very narrow exception, as it is unlikely
that federal law expressly permits harboring. Valley Park may be
attempting to defer to federal determinations that permit an illegal
alien to remain in the country while his or her case is on appeal,
but the true meaning of the "expressly permitted" language is
ambiguous and thus this clause is ineffective.
Immigration regulation not only encompasses those guidelines
that determine an immigrant's entrance into the United States but
also encompasses the conditions that aliens are subject to while
they remain in the country. The tenancy ordinances are arguably
imposing regional residency restraints upon aliens. Therefore,
tenancy provisions potentially impose a significant burden upon
federal immigration policy because of the possible restrictions. It
seems clear that Hazleton and other cities will argue that they are
not imposing any sort of burden upon aliens because they are
targeting illegal entrants who are not authorized to reside in this
nation. This argument is compelling, but, as will be addressed
subsequently, these tenancy provisions potentially create an alien
database, which is a regulation of aliens and thus beyond the police
power of subordinate governments.
Hazleton's tenancy provision, which requires every occupant
of the city to register with the city in order to facilitate the ease of
illegal immigration checks, is likely preempted by the federal
government's authority to determine the aliens admitted into the
nation and the conditions imposed during their stay in the United
States. As recognized in Lozano, Hazleton's ordinance is similar to
an alien registration requirement that Pennsylvania attempted to
adopt in Hines v. Davidowitz.73 In Hines, the State of Pennsylvania
72. Valley Park, Mo. Ordinance 1708 § 5A (July 17, 2006).
73. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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required all aliens over the age of eighteen to register with the
State.74 Pennsylvania created this law prior to any federal alien
registration program, but eventually a federal program was created.
The federal law, however, required aliens fourteen years and older
to register with the federal government and thus the two laws
conflicted. The Supreme Court held Pennsylvania's law preempted
and stated:
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard
for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with,
curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations.75
Hazleton's ordinance is distinguishable from Hines on several
grounds. First, in Hines the state law expressly conflicted with the
federal law because of the difference in age requirements. Second,
the Pennsylvania statute in Hines attempted to directly regulate all
legal and illegal aliens while Hazleton is attempting to regulate the
issuance of business licenses. Hazleton is attempting to reduce the
incentive for businesses
to violate federal law and increase costs
76
within the city.
Even if the tenancy provisions are ultimately declared valid,
whether they will be successful is debatable. It seems reasonable to
conclude that the immigration influx will not suddenly dissipate
simply because the tenancy provisions make it more difficult to
find a place to live in the city. Rather, it seems logical to conclude
that illegal immigrants will simply find private homes or other
sanctuaries where they can stay and thereby evade law
enforcement. Assumedly, federal policy objective and enforcement
schemes are aimed at removing illegal immigrants, and thus the
city's tenancy ordinances may conflict with and undermine these
federal goals by driving illegal immigrants into seclusion.
2. Conflict Preemption
Tenancy provisions attempt to restrict the harboring of illegal
aliens in accordance with federal law; thus, it would appear that the
74. Id. at 56.
75. Id. at 66-67.
76. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Testimony of Honorable
Louis Barletta, Mayor of City of Hazleton (2006), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfT?id=1983&wit id=5495.
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provisions do not conflict facially with federal immigration policy.
Given the statutory scheme, Congress' intent is arguably to restrict
illegal entrants from residing in the United States; if the analysis
focused solely upon congressional intent, then the ordinances
would be valid. Cities have rested upon this presumption in their
creation of their tenancy provisions, but this conclusion may not be
entirely accurate. As recognized by the Lozano court, the tenancy
ordinances conflict with federal policy objectives because they fail
to account for those aliens who have been allowed to remain in the
country but who are not legally present. More significantly, the
tenancy provisions are invalid because they create a database of
aliens, which conflicts with federal policy.
Creating a database of aliens imposes additional burdens upon
aliens who are already registered with the federal government. In
Hazleton, all dwelling occupants of the city are required to fill out
an occupancy card for the purpose of creating and maintaining a
database of potential illegal immigrants. Farmers Branch, on the
other hand, simply requires the landlord to make copies of
occupants' legal status documents and retain them for two years.
The cities are clearly acting in a vacuum as the federal government
has not attempted to require occupancy cards in order to create a
database of potential illegal entrants. Despite Congress' lack of
activity in this area, the cities' express purpose is to create
databases of potential illegal entrants. Therefore, it would appear
that these cities are in conflict with federal policy which does not
mandate this local record keeping.
IV.POLICY
As previously stated, the illegal immigration debate is a
sensitive and heated topic. As such, this Comment has attempted to
focus solely upon the legal aspects of the issue, via statutory
interpretation and by engaging in a preemption analysis of two
provisions, in an effort to draw a distinction between acceptable
and unacceptable exercises of local authority in the field of
immigration. Nevertheless, a full analysis would not be complete
without a brief examination into the possible policy ramifications
of allowing any local participation in immigration matters.
Opponents of municipal ordinances argue that allowing states
and cities to impose licensing restrictions upon local businesses
will disrupt the uniform immigration policy and thus may have a
negative impact upon the nation's foreign policy. 77 This argument
77. The Lozano court stated the following: "United States foreign relations is
affected by the manner in which the balance is struck. Excessive enforcement
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is flawed in two key ways. First, federal law prohibits an employer
from knowingly employing illegal immigrants and also prohibits
the harboring of illegal immigrants. The municipal ordinances
reflect these same objectives, and because they simply mirror
federal policy, they logically cannot be deemed to be inconsistent
with federal policy. Second, if the licensing exception expressly
provided to the states and cities creates a non-uniform policy, then
it is Congress, and Congress alone, that must adjust the statute to
reflect their concern for foreign relations.
It is usurpation of
78
authority for the courts to determine this.
Assuming that both the federal employer provisions and the
anti-harboring statutes are aimed at preventing illegal immigration,
states and cities must support the policy in order for it to be
effective. The employer provisions do not undermine the federal
prohibition against employment of illegal immigrants but rather
remove the incentive to violate the federal law. In this way, the
cities are providing needed assistance to the federal government.
Judge Learned Hand aptly pointed out that "it would be
unreasonable to suppose that [the federal government's] _purpose
was to deny itself any help that the states may allow."" Judge
Hand's insight into the relationship between the federal
government and its dependence upon states and cities is a logical
analysis of the instant matter where concurrent legislation between
federal and local governments exists. In support of Judge Hand's
insight is the Clear Act proposal introduced in September 2007.
The Clear Act reaffirms states and cities inherent police powers to
enforce immigration laws and protect its citizens.
[L]aw enforcement personnel of a State, or of a political
subdivision of a State, have the inherent authority of a
sovereign entity to investigate, identify, apprehend, arrest,
detain, or transfer to Federal custody aliens in the United
States (including the transportation of such aliens across State
lines to detention centers), for the purpose of assisting in the

jeopardizes our alliances and cooperation with regard to matters such as
immigration enforcement, drug interdiction and counter-terrorism investigations."
496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 528 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
78. Concern with disrupting a uniform national policy must focus upon
sanctuary cities. These cities overtly violate federal law and yet escape
constitutional challenge. If there is concern about uniform national policy then
ordinances that expressly prohibit employees from reporting illegal immigrants
to federal authorities must be struck down as preempted.
79. Brief of Respondent at 31, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d
477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06-cv-01586-JMM) (quoting Marsh v. United
States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 1928)).
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enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States in
the course of carrying out routine duties. This State authority
has never been displaced or preempted by Congress.8 °
What is most interesting about the Clear Act of 2007 is that the
bill clearly states that the inherent police powers of states and
municipalities has never been displaced or preempted by Congress
in the field of immigration enforcement. Given the recent
jurisprudence, which attempted to interpret congressional intent to
preempt state and local enforcement of immigration policy, it
seems clear that the Clear Act proposal indicates that there is no
congressional intent to either expressly or impliedly completely
occupy the field of enforcement of immigration policies. If this
interpretation of the Clear Act is accurate, then the Lozano court's
field preemption analysis is flawed.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The immigration crisis is increasingly becoming a central
concern to citizens and officials throughout the nation. States and
cities will continue to devise and enact laws in order to deal with
perceived threats to their communities. 8 1 Undoubtedly, these laws
will face constitutional challenges. This begs the question, what
laws may a state or city enact to mitigate the burdens of illegal
immigration but which are not preempted?
One scholar has summarized Supreme Court jurisprudence on
this issue.
A state may endeavor to deter illegal immigration, not as an
end of its own, but as a means toward protecting traditional
state concerns .... To borrow a phrase, if aliens "constitute
a peculiar source of evil at which [a state law] is aimed," it
may legislate against them, not to deter8 immigration
per se,
2
but to ameliorate the impact they cause.
80. Clear Act, H. R. 3494, 110th Cong. (2007).
81. Recently, cities have begun to enact anti-loitering provisions, which
target day laborers and their employers. Another suspect ordinance gaining
popularity seeks to impose residency limits upon rental properties. This
provision restricts the number of individuals that can live in a single residential
property. The point of these examples is to illustrate that simply striking down
one ordinance will not eliminate the problem, but rather cities and states will
continue to find new ingenious ways of attempting to mitigate the consequences
of illegal immigration.
82. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 986-87 (1995) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
228 (1982)).
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This reference to Plyer v. Doe is especially applicable in the
instant matter for two reasons. First, Plyer concerned the impact of
illegal immigration upon cities and states. This is an important
distinction because ordinances that attempt to regulate aliens
legally admitted into the country are illegitimate. States and cities
have no authority to attempt to regulate legal aliens' employment,
residence, or any other condition imposed upon them. This is
because Congress alone determines the policies and procedures
through which one may enter and remain in the United States.
Illegal entrants, however, are prohibited under federal law and thus
are obviously distinguishable from legal aliens. Nevertheless,
states and cities may not create their local sanctions targeted at
illegal entrants. They may, however, regulate those industries
which profit from imposing costs upon the city. Second, Plyer
states that local legislation may attempt to reduce the burden of
illegal immigration via legislation. 83 The purpose of the legislation
is a key ingredient in the determining whether the ordinance is
legitimate; an ordinance that is aimed at reducing crime and
eliminating economic crisis has the foundation of a valid
ordinance. The United States Supreme Court recognized this in
DeCanasand affirmed it in Plyer.The Court stated, "The states do
have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least
where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a
legitimate state goal."84 These types of local ordinances are not
attempting to directly regulate immigration policy but rather are
simply attempting to reduce the negative impact illegal
immigration has upon the community.
Ordinances must be crafted so as not to impose burdensome
supplemental regulatory requirements upon aliens, illegal or legal.
For example, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:100.13
requires that nonresident aliens and alien students may not operate
motor vehicles without documentation demonstrating that they are
lawfully present in the United States. Violating the statute subjects
the offender to no more than a $1,000 fine and/or imprisonment for
not more than one Aear with or without hard labor or both the fine
and imprisonment.

83. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 228 (1982) (where the court acknowledges that
while the Texas statute in question is illegitimate, it also recognizes that "[s]tates
might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of
sudden shifts in population..
84. Id.at 225.
85. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recently held that this
ordinance was unconstitutional as it was preempted by federal immigration
legislation. State v. Lopez, 948 So. 2d 1121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006).
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Second, the ordinances must not be a direct regulation of
aliens. Historic jurisprudence seems to suggest that direct
regulation of aliens will be preempted while regulation of ancillary
matters that indirectly impact immigration will not. For example,
the invalid Louisiana motor vehicle statute directly imposes
burdens, requirements, and conditions upon aliens whereas the
Hazleton, Valley Park, Farmers Branch, and Arizona laws regulate
businesses within its borders; they do not attempt to directly
regulate illegal or legal aliens. Additionally, federal law provides
express authority to subordinate governments to regulate the
licenses of its businesses with respect to violation of federal
immigration policy. This is not the case in the Louisiana statute.
The Louisiana statute does not regulate business licenses and is not
aimed at harboring but rather imposes an additional requirement
directly upon all aliens that the federal government does not
impose. This additional requirement is burdensome and is
therefore preempted.
Third, the ordinances must not be vague or ambiguous. The
ambiguity in the ordinances rests in two areas: with whom in the
federal government the cities are verifying their information and
what documentation is being used to determine the legal status. It
may be that the ordinances are impliedly suggesting that the
Department of Homeland Security or that the Social Security
Administration is consulted, as it is used in the Basic Pilot
Program. Similarly, the ordinances implicitly suggest that the same
documentation required to hire a person (1-9 information) is
required to prove status to the city code enforcement officer. If
state and municipal legislation are to withstand attack, they must
be written to expressly reflect the exact federal agency who is
determining the legal status and which documents are being used
to determine legal status.
The Hazleton, Valley Park, and Farmers Branch ordinances do
not authorize code enforcement officers to independently
determine legal status but rather require the officers to verify the
status with the federal government. The ordinances do not,
however, expressly prohibit it and thus differ from Arizona's
legislation. This is an important distinction because the municipal
ordinances have been challenged upon grounds that cities are
independently making alien status determinations.
Thus, in order to shield future ordinances from attack, state and
local legislation must be written to explicitly state that the
documentation required by the code enforcement officer is the
same documentation that Homeland Security and the Social
Security Administration use to verify legal status. Statutes and
ordinances must also expressly reflect that an employer may
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appeal a determination that he is knowingly employing an illegal
worker. Although local ordinances contain an implied requirement
that employers have knowledge of their employees illegal status
before the license is revoked, in order to shield the ordinances from
challenge they must expressly provide a knowledge requirement.
Finally, ordinances must adopt federal standards rather than
supplement them. The Farmers Branch ordinance was struck down
for two reasons. First, the city failed to use federal immigration
standards for determining illegal status. Second, the ordinance
required the property manager to examine documentation in order
to verify legal status rather than allowing the federal government to
determine legal status. Interestingly, the Lozano court found the
employer provision preempted in part because federal law required
the employer to determine legal status while the city ordinance
authorized the code enforcement officer to verify status with the
federal government. It appears that if an ordinance is to avoid
being preempted it must strictly adhere to federal immigration
standards, which means not only adopting the appropriate
definitions of illegal entrant but
86 also ensuring that only federal
agencies determine legal status.
Undoubtedly, state and local ordinances that attempt to reduce
the impact of illegal immigration upon its communities will be
challenged. However, these ordinances will not be deemed
preempted if they attempt to operate within the field expressly left
open to them by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court's ruling in DeCanas v. Bica, it has
been settled law that state legislation or municipal ordinances that
indirectly impact immigration matters are not per se preempted.
Despite this long standing rule, recent court decisions have found
municipal ordinances that suspend or revoke business licenses of
employers who violate federal law invalid. These rulings rest upon
tenuous grounds, not only because they ignore the express
exception that Congress provided to subordinate governments to
suspend or revoke licenses, but also because they ignore the
inherent police powers that cities and states retain to protect their
citizens and their communities.

86. The Northern District of Texas determination that the property manager
was making an independent determination of legal status is directly contrary to
the federal employer provision, which requires the employer to examine identity
documentation for validity.
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This Comment does not suggest, however, that all municipal
ordinances are valid. In fact, any state legislation or ordinance that
attempts to directly regulate aliens or that attempts to impose
regional burdens are invalid for a number of reasons; one of which,
for example, is that they interfere with Congress' exclusive right to
regulate immigration policy. For this reason, tenancy ordinances,
as described herein, are preempted. These ordinances attempt to
create a regional alien database from which to run potential illegal
alien status checks. Despite the lack of congressional activity in
this area and the federal anti-harboring statute, this type of
database has a potential for creating significant regional regulation
of immigration policy. For this reason, these ordinances are not
valid.
This Comment illustrates the difference between ordinances
that are not preempted and those that are invalid under the
Supremacy Clause by drawing upon two popular ordinances. In
doing so, certain conclusions can be drawn: only those ordinances
that do not directly regulate immigrants, which do not impose
additional regional burdens and that have a valid and legitimate
purpose pursuant to local police powers will survive constitutional
challenge.
Susan M Bartlett*
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